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Abstract Research on the relation between the structure of
the self-concept and psychological well-being has yielded
seemingly inconsistent and even conflicting results. This arti-
cle presents studies that examined the validity of often-used
measures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation
and tested their ability to predict personal identity and active
cognitive processing. The findings revealed several conceptu-
al and methodological problems that continue to plague self-
structure research, including the conflating of self-concept
content and self-concept structure. In short, our data indicated
that the commonly used indices of self-complexity and self-
concept differentiation cannot be considered pure measures of
the underlying dimensions of self-structure. In addition, only
weak correlations of the self-structure variables with measures
of personal identity and thinking dispositions have been
found. Moreover, once the theoretically irrelevant sources of
variance were controlled, the effects of the included structural
features of the self-concept on the outcomes of interest either
did not occur or were less pronounced. Given the above, it
seems reasonable to suggest that at least some of the conclu-
sions regarding the adaptive value of self-structural variables
drawn from previous research in this field need revision.
Keywords Self-complexity . Self-concept differentiation .
Measurement . Identity . Cognitive processing
Introduction
The majority of contemporary theorists and researchers in
personality psychology agree that self-concept is a dynamic
and multifaceted phenomenon (e.g., Greenwald and Pratkanis
1988; Markus and Wurf 1987; Roberts 2007; Suszek 2007;
Swann and Bosson 2010). The notion of the self as plural
allows distinguishing between its content (i.e., what one
thinks one is like) and structural features (i.e., how the con-
tents are organized). After nearly 3 decades of research it has
been shown that there are individual differences in the self-
concept structure. However, the functionality of various struc-
tural features of the self-concept appeared to be different de-
pending on their operationalization and measurement.
This article presents the results of a series of studies carried
out by the authors, sharing a common focus on the validity of
operationalization and adaptive value of two, broadly
discussed in the psychological literature, structural aspects of
self, namely self-complexity (Linville 1985, 1987) and self-
concept differentiation (Donahue et al. 1993).
Self-Complexity
Among the various models of self-complexity (e.g., Anderson
1992; Evans 1994; Stein 1994; Woolfolk et al. 1995),
Linville’s social-cognitive model of self-complexity (1985,
1987) is by far the most widely studied and cited (Rafaeli
and Hiller 2010). According to Linville, self-complexity re-
flects the number and diversity of self-aspects developed for
meaningful aspects of one’s life. So, theoretically, it is consid-
ered as two-dimensional, capturing both differentiation and
integration. To measure self-complexity, Linville adopted the
dimensionality statistic (H), a measure of nominal scale dis-
persion utilized in exact sciences. This index is obtained in a
trait-sorting task in which participants ascribe a predefined set
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of traits to a variable (self-generated) set of self-aspects. High
self-complexity results from trait sorts composed of a high
number of self-aspects with low redundancy between them
(i.e., low repetition of trait adjectives). The basic assumption
of Linville’s model (1985, 1987) is that greater self-
complexity moderates the negative effects of stressful situa-
tions. With a more complex self-concept, the impact of a
stress-inducing event is less likely to spill over from one
self-aspect to another.
Research examining the stress-buffering role of self-
complexity has been vigorously pursued since Linville’s mod-
el was introduced. Over the decades, it has been used to ad-
dress various adjustment outcomes, ranging from depression
(e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007; Linville 1987) to narcissism
(Rhodewalt and Morf 1995). These studies, however, have
yielded mixed results. Specifically, some research has shown
a positive link between self-complexity and psychological ad-
justment (e.g., Cohen et al. 1997; Dixon and Baumeister
1991; Linville 1987; Niedenthal et al. 1992), some studies
have found a negative link (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli 2007;
Jordan and Cole 1996), and some findings implied no rela-
tionship (e.g., Assanand 2003; Campbell et al. 2003;
Gramzow et al. 2000). Such results have called into question
both the validity of Linville’s measure and the model itself
(see, for review, Koch and Shepperd 2004; Rafaeli and Hiller
2010; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg 2002). Several researchers
argue that different types of content could be organized differ-
ently and that such factors as the valence of self-descriptors
should be taken into account (Morgan and Janoff-Bulman
1994; Woolfolk et al. 1995). Other studies suggest, though,
that what is problematic is not the model, but its measurement,
namely the H statistic (Locke 2003; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999).
As a result, distinguishing two components of self-complexity
– the number of self-aspects and the degree of overlap in their
content – has been advocated as a more appropriate approach
(Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999). Based on these twomeasures, a new
composite measure of self-complexity has then been proposed
(SC, Sakaki 2004).
Self-Concept Differentiation
The second component of self-complexity, overlap, can be
conceptually tied to the concept of self-concept differentiation
(self-incoherence).1 Self-concept differentiation refers to an
individual’s tendency to view oneself as possessing different
personality characteristics across different social roles or con-
texts (Donahue et al. 1993). To assess self-concept differenti-
ation, Donahue et al. (1993) developed the procedure in which
participants rate how well a fixed set of traits describe them in
experimenter-provided social roles. The self-concept differen-
tiation index (SCD) can be expressed as the unshared vari-
ance, the mean intercorrelation, or the absolute differences
among the role identities (Campbell et al. 2003; Donahue
et al. 1993; Styła et al. 2010). Various linear transformations
of the above indices are also used, although less frequently
(e.g., Sheldon et al. 1997; Suh 2002).
Prior research on self-concept differentiation has pointed to
the adaptive value of self-concept consistency and argued that
high self-concept differentiation is indicative of an incoherent
and fragmented self-concept (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003; Diehl
and Hay 2010; Diehl et al. 2001; Donahue et al. 1993;
McReynolds et al. 2000; Sheldon et al. 1997; Styła et al.
2010). This concurs with Block’s (1961) description of an
individual who lacks a coherent self as “an interpersonal cha-
meleon, with no inner core of identity, fitfully reacting in all
ways to all people” (p. 392). Although the association of self-
concept differentiation with psychological maladjustment has
been repeatedly demonstrated, it might appear contrary to
both everyday and clinical experience. After all, rigidity and
inflexibility of behavior is considered as an essential diagnos-
tic criterion for personality disorders (DSM-IV, American
Psychiatric Association 1994; ICD-10, World Health Organi-
zation 1992). Additional concerns were raised by findings that
the SCD index, while in theory a measure of the self-concept
structure, was influenced by its content (Locke 2006). More-
over, the indices based on correlation coefficients do present
some calculation problems, since they are also dependent up-
on variance in how traits are rated in a given situation (Baird
et al. 2006; Locke 2006). In fact, the SCD index will not be
identified if there is no within situation variance whatsoever.
Finally, methodological concerns have been raisedwith regard
to the SCD index based on an average standard deviation.
Specifically, Baird et al. (2006) argued that this measure of
self-concept differentiation conflates trait mean-level informa-
tion and information concerning within-person variability, and
that the previously identified associations between psycholog-
ical adjustment and self-concept differentiation may be, at
least to some degree, a statistical artifact (see also La
Guardia and Ryan 2007).
Self-Complexity Versus Self-Concept Differentiation
Since both self-complexity – overlap in particular – and self-
concept differentiation theoretically refer to the same idea of
contextualized self-views, how they relate to each other has
received some attention. Donahue et al. (1993) argued that
these aspects of self-concept structure are different in two
respects: first, self-complexity includes not only the distinc-
tiveness, but also the numerousness of self-aspects; and sec-
ond, the original Linville’s self-complexity hypothesis does
not postulate a direct link between self-complexity and
1 We used Styła et al.’s (2010) tool called Self-Incoherence Scale to assess
self-concept differentiation. Therefore, the terms self-concept differentia-
tion and self-incoherence will be used interchangeable throughout this
paper.
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adjustment. Campbell et al. (1991) contributed to this issue by
pointing out that there is a crucial, though slightly ambiguous,
difference between a complex self-concept and an uncertain
one. In a similar way, Koch and Shepperd (2004) emphasized
the distinction between self-complexity and cohesion within
the self.
The empirical evidence supports the above reasoning by
indicating that self-complexity and self-concept differentia-
tion have dissimilar relationships with indices of well-being.
Specifically, measures of self-concept differentiation have
consistently been found to be positively related to depression,
negative affectivity, and low self-esteem, whereas self-
complexity measure has been shown to buffer against the
harmful effects of stress on mental health outcomes such as
depression (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003; Constantino et al.
2006; Dixon and Baumeister 1991; Lutz and Ross 2003;
Niedenthal et al. 1992). Perhaps more puzzling is the lack of
convergence of indices that purport to measure only the dis-
tinctiveness component of self-concept structure (also referred
to as self-concept unity), namely overlap and self-concept
differentiation (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006; Diehl et al.
2001). Such findings are, however, consistent with the sug-
gestion that measures of SCD tap the negative experience of a
fragmented self, whereas measures of self-complexity tap the
positive experience of specialization of role identities. This
difference supposedly is due to the way the two constructs
are assessed – self-complexity scores are derived from self-
generated roles that are idiosyncratic in content, whereas self-
concept differentiation task uses participants’ self-ratings for
personality attributes across experimenter-provided roles
(e.g., Donahue et al. 1993; Koch and Shepperd 1991, Lutz
and Ross 2003).
Summary and Aim
There is a vast body of literature – theoretically, empirically,
and clinically anchored – that suggests the importance of con-
sidering self-structure variables when attempting to under-
stand the nature and function of the self-concept. Yet, empir-
ical work in this area has produced inconsistent findings and is
clearly hampered by measurement problems. This article aims
to address these issues. Specifically, the purposes of the stud-
ies were to:
(a) examine different measures of self-complexity, obtained
from the same trait-sort task: the quantity of self-aspects
and the overlap among them, each reflecting one of the
self-complexity components (Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999),
and the H statistic (Linville 1987) and the SC statistic
(Sakaki 2004), each representing a singular measure of
self-complexity;
(b) examine different indices of self-concept differentiation:
one representing the absolute differences among the
identities (i.e., the mean standard deviation across attri-
butes; Donahue et al. 1993; Styła et al. 2010), one
expressed as the mean intercorrelation among the role
identities (Campbell et al. 2003), and one representing
the proportion of variance in the role-identity ratings that
was not shared across the roles (Block 1961; Donahue
et al. 1993);
(c) investigate the mutual relationships between various
measures of self-complexity and self-concept
differentiation;
(d) test the assumption of independence of self-concept
structure and self-concept content, specifically the sensi-
tivity of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation
indices to affective valence of self-descriptions used to
measure them; and
(e) establish the relationship between self-complexity, self-
concept differentiation, and well-being outcomes, partic-
ularly those relating to personal identity and thinking
dispositions.
Our focus on personal identity stems from the notion,
well grounded in theoretical and empirical research, that
regards a sense of personal identity as an indication of ef-
fective adaptation and mental health, the cornerstone of the
capacity to do well (e.g., Crawford et al. 2004; Erikson
1980; for review, see also Bosma and Kunnen 2001;
Schwartz 2001). In addition to the identity variables, we also
chose to focus on three cognitive variables that are known to
promote meaning and integration of self-knowledge: need
for cognition (Cacioppo et al. 1996), reflection (Trapnell
and Campbell 1999), and integrative self-knowledge
(Ghorbani et al. 2008). Each of these variables has displayed
positive associations with psychological adjustment (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al. 1996; Fleischhauer et al. 2010; Ghorbani
et al. 2010, 2008; Trapnell and Campbell 1999), contributing
to a growing consensus that self-awareness and self-
understanding play a key role in self-regulation. This exam-
ination becomes even more important, since structural fea-
tures of the self-concept themselves reflect the ways that
people cognitively organize knowledge about the self (e.g.,
Linville 1985; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg 2002).
It should be noted that, despite the fact that self-complexity
and self-concept differentiation have been extensively
researched, their relationships with personal identity and
thinking dispositions have received little attention. To the ex-
tent that the existing literature allows conclusions, it appears
that the greater the differentiation and the lower the integration
among one’s self-aspects, the weaker one’s sense of identity
(e.g., Block 1961; Donahue et al. 1993; Goldman 2004).
However, that postulation still needs to be explored empirical-
ly. As for thinking dispositions in question, we are not aware
of any empirical evidence regarding the relationships of these
factors to self-complexity and self-concept differentiation.
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Method
Overview and Procedure
The data reported in this paper were drawn from three
studies carried out as part of a research project aimed at
identifying relationships between self-concept structure
and characteristics of personal identity. The studies were
conducted in a collaborative mode, ensuring anonymity
and confidentiality. The participants were informed
about the purpose of the research project. The consent
of each individual was the condition of participation in
the research. Participants completed measures of self-
complexity, self-differentiation, identity, and thinking
dispositions as well as several questionnaires assessing
constructs not relevant to the subject of this article.
Participants
The samples were pooled based on age and education.
We utilized data collected from university students and
young adults with a college degree. In Study 1a there
were 336 participants, whose ages ranged from 18 to 35
(M =21.65 yrs, SD =3.20 yrs). Women comprised
65.8 % of the participants. Study 1b included 544 par-
ticipants between the ages of 18 and 32 (M =21.26 yrs,
SD =1.46 yrs). Of this sample, 59.4 % were female.
The sample in Study 1c consisted of 131 participants
whose ages ranged from 20 to 34 (M =24.66 yrs, SD
=3.13 yrs); 54.3 % were female.
Measures
Because the three studies differed in the content of the test
batteries administered, we note belowwhich studies contained
each measure.
Self-Complexity To obtain measures of self-complexity, we
used the Self-Complexity Questionnaire by Barczak et al.
(2007). This instrument is based on self-descriptive trait-
sorting task used by Linville (1987), but contains several mi-
nor adaptations.
First, the trait adjectives were listed in a sheet given to
each participant, instead of being printed on cards. Second,
a longer and more balanced list of traits was used. Sixty
traits, divided equally between those with positive and neg-
ative valence, were used in place of the original list of 33
(mostly positively valenced) traits. The stimulus words
were compiled by having psychology students (N=186)
provide adjectives that described eight people: a teacher
they like, a politician they wouldn’t vote for, their best
friend, a sibling, a person they don’t like, their ideal person
and the opposite of that ideal. This resulted in a list of 493
unique adjectives. The final list was composed of 30 pos-
itively valenced adjectives (e.g., outgoing, trustworthy,
kind, ambitious) and 30 negatively valenced adjectives
(e.g., mean, selfish, lazy, withdrawn) most commonly men-
tioned by the students.
The participants were provided with a list of adjectives
and a recording sheet with blank columns. They were first
prompted to read the list and then think of the different
roles they play in their lives. After that the participants
were asked to form groups of traits, so that each group
was descriptive of an aspect of their life. The descriptive
groups were recorded in the blank columns of the record-
ing sheet and labeled by the participants. No limit was
placed on the number of groups or on the number of
adjectives within each group. The participants were in-
formed that each adjective may be used in more than
one group or not at all.
Each participant’s trait sort was then used to calculate
four measures of self-complexity. Two of them indicated
the two components of self-complexity as suggested by
Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999). One was the number of self-
aspects formed by the participants (NSA). The other
was the degree of overlap between self-aspects (OL),
which reflects the average communality between all
pairs of self-aspects. Another two measures represented
self-complexity as a whole. One was the H statistic
endorsed by Linville (1987), which represents the num-
ber of independent or nonredundant dimensions under-
lying each grouping. The other was the SC statistic
proposed by Sakaki (2004), which is a single composite
measure of self-complexity, alternative to the one of
Linville (1987). As argued by Sakaki (2006), the SC
statistic provides a direct index of self-complexity, and
serves as a better indicator of self-complexity than the
H statistic. The corresponding formulas are presented in
Table 1. A remark should be made regarding Sakaki’s
SC formula, which uses overlap as a divisor. If the
overlap score is zero then the result would be a divide
by zero error. Unfortunately, Sakaki (2004) did not
comment on this or propose an alternative approach to
avoid the divide-by-zero situation.
Table 1 Formulas for calculating self-complexity
OL = (∑i(∑jCij)/Tj)/n*(n−1),
where C is the number of common features in two aspects; T is the total
number of features in the referent aspect; n is the total number of
aspects in the person’s sort and i and j vary from 0 to n (i and j unequal).
H = log2n−(∑ini log2ni)/n,
where n is the total number of features (here 60), and ni is the number of
features that appear in a particular group combination.
SC = NSA/OL,
where NSA is the total number of self-aspects in the person’s sort and OL
is the person’s overlap score.
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The Self-Complexity Questionnaire was included in test
batteries administered in Studies 1b and 1c.
Self-Concept Differentiation The participants completed the
Self-Incoherence Scale by Styła et al. (2010). This tool is a
self-concept integration measure based on Block’s (1961) and
Donahue et al.’s (1993) scales. The participants were
instructed to rate how descriptive 7 personality traits are of
them in each of five different social roles (student, romantic
partner, son or daughter, friend, and worker), using a 7-point
Likert scale.
The 7 attributes (i.e., active, open-minded, loyal, self-con-
fident, resourceful, independent, direct) were selected after a
series of pilot studies. First, a group of psychology students
(N=24) was asked to read the list of 68 trait adjectives and
mark those which describe them. An initial pool of attributes
was derived from the Questionnaire of Social Perception
(Jarymowicz 2008). They were broad personal characteristics
and adjective markers that represent the Big Five traits (e.g.,
creative, outgoing, hardworking, helpful, sensitive). The pilot
version of the Self-Incoherence Scale included 27 adjectives
most commonly chosen by the students. In succeeding stud-
ies, a total of 317 participants completed the pilot version.
Then, all items were factor-analyzed to obtain factor scores
for each of them. Fourteen items with the greatest factor load-
ings were selected and split into two parallel versions of the
scale. A final study (N=94) showed that one of these versions
produced better validity coefficients then the other, and was
suggested as preferable for scientific research (Styła et al.
2010).
Three different indices of self-concept differentiation were
computed for each participant from the data generated by this
task. The first one was suggested by Styła et al. (2010), but
previously used also by others (e.g., Donahue et al. 1993;
Goldman 2004). This index represents the absolute differ-
ences among the roles. In particular, we computed the stan-
dard deviation of each of the participant’s personality trait
ratings across each role (7 standard deviations in all), and then
averaged them. The resulting score (SCDSD) represents the
extent that participants’ personality trait ratings had deviated
from one another when describing themselves across their
different roles. As the second index of self-concept differenti-
ation we used the average correlation among the roles
(SCDR), as proposed by Campbell et al. (2003). Correlations
between each participant’s five roles (10 correlations in all)
were computed on the basis of the adjectives ratings made in
each role. This measure provides an inverse measure of self-
concept differentiation. The third index was computed by
factor-analyzing the correlation matrix, and subtracting the
percent of variance accounted for by the first principal com-
ponent from 100 percent. The resulting score represents the
proportion of unshared variance among the roles (SCDVAR).
That is, higher scores on this measure reflect greater
differentiation of self. This index was proposed by Block
(1961), and then used by Donahue et al. (1993).2
The Self-Incoherence Scale was used in Studies 1a and 1b.
Sense of Identity To measure a sense of personal identity,
understood as a recurring mode of experiencing oneself-as-
subject, extended form of theMultidimensional Questionnaire
of Identity (MQI; Pilarska 2012, 2014a) was employed. The
questionnaire consists of six subscales measuring the degree
of accessibility, specificity, separateness, coherence, stability,
and valuation of identity content (referred to, respectively, as
sense of having inner contents, sense of uniqueness, sense of
one’s own boundaries, sense of coherence, sense of continuity
over time, and sense of self-worth), including a total of 43
items (e.g., I feel that I was once a very different person than
I am now; It happens that I perceive my close one as an
important part of my self). All items are evaluated on a four-
level scale ranging from “strongly disagree/never” to “strong-
ly agree/always”. In addition, a single composite score for a
global sense of identity (GSI) was computed by averaging
scores across all identity dimensions.3 In earlier studies, reli-
ability coefficients for the identity dimensions varied from
0.62 to 0.86, with an average Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 (e.g.,
Pilarska 2014a; Suchańska and Worach 2013). For our sam-
ple, the standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the
overall scale was 0.90, and ranged from 0.62 to 0.79 (average,
0.72) for the individual subscales.
We included the Multidimensional Questionnaire of Iden-
tity in all three studies.
Identity Processes The Identity and Experience Scale (IES)
by Whitbourne and collegues (2002) in its Polish version by
Suchańska and Jawłowska (2010, as cited in Jawłowska 2010)
was used for measuring the identity processes. This tool con-
sists of 33 statements, 11 for each scale: assimilation (e.g.,
When it comes to understanding myself, I’d rather not look
too deeply), accommodation (e.g., Very influenced by what
others think), and balance (e.g., Often take stock of what I
have or have not accomplished). The participants respond on
a seven-point scale from “definitely no” to “definitely yes”.
The three subscales demonstrated reasonable internal
2 In computing the SCDSD score, we allowed for up to seven non-
responses (20 %), with no more than one omission on each trait adjective.
When calculating SCD indices based on correlation coefficients, we
allowed for one role (20 %) to be excluded from the correlation matrix,
either because of the zero within variance or because of non-responses on
all seven trait adjectives. The remaining six correlations were then aver-
aged or processed by factor analysis to obtain the SCDR and the SCDVAR
scores, respectively.
3 We allowed for up to 20 % of non-responses in each subscale and then
used a single imputation procedure (person mean substitution). Missing
values were replaced with the intraindividual mean of the other items on
that subscale. Missing responses to the other multi-item measures used in
this study were treated in the same manner unless otherwise specified.
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consistency, with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69 for
assimilation, 0.83 for accommodation, and 0.83 for balance.
The Identity and Experience Scale was employed in Study
1c.
The Study lb battery contained the following scales mea-
suring selected thinking dispositions.
Need for Cognition Need for cognition was assessed via an
adapted version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS;
Cacioppo and Petty 1982; Matusz et al. 2011). The scale in-
cludes 36 items that focus on engagement in and enjoyment of
intellectual activities (e.g., I try to avoid situations that require
intensive thinking from me; I enjoy broadening my knowl-
edge about things); each evaluated on a five-point scale, rang-
ing from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Psychomet-
ric properties of the Polish version of the NCS are comparable
to those of the original version: the reliability and stability
indices are α=0.91 and r=0.86, respectively (Matusz et al.
2011). In the present sample, the internal consistency of this
NCS, as measured by Cronbach’s standardized reliability co-
efficient, was α=0.88.
Reflection Reflection, an openness-related form of self-
focused attention, was measured with the 8-item Reflection
subscale taken from the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire
– Shortform (RRQ Shortforms) by Trapnell (1997). Every
item (e.g., I love exploring my “inner” self) is presented on a
five-point scale, allowing for a range of responses from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The Cronbach’s stan-
dardized reliability coefficient for the translated version of this
scale was 0.80.
Integrative Self-Knowledge The Integrative Self-
Knowledge Scale (ISK; Ghorbani et al. 2008; Polish
adaptation by Pilarska 2014b) assesses a temporally integrated
understanding of processes within the self. The scale includes
12 items referring to an individual’s efforts (1) to understand
past experience (e.g., If I need to, I can reflect about myself
and clearly understand the feelings and attitudes behind my
past behaviors), (2) to maintain awareness of the self in the
present (e.g., Most of the time, I get so involved in what is
going on that I really can’t see how I am responding to a
situation), and (3) to move toward desired goals in the future
(e.g., By thinking deeply about myself, I can discover what I
really want in life and how I might get it). Each item is rated
on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “largely untrue” to
“largely true”. The Polish version of the ISK scale has good
construct validity, and satisfactory internal consistency
(Pilarska 2014b). In our sample, internal reliability in terms
of Cronbach’s standardized alpha was found to be 0.79.
Results
For clarity of presentation, the results with brief comments are
presented in five major sections, followed by a more general
discussion of the results and their implications. It should be
noted that parts of the analyses were performed in the individ-
ual samples, while other parts were conducted using the com-
bined data (for the sake of increasing statistical power). In
each of the following sections, we state which data set was
used.
Measures of Self-Complexity
We started with examining psychometric properties of alter-
native measures of self-complexity: the dimensionality statis-
tic (H), quantity of self-aspects (NSA) and overlap among
them (OL), and a composite index of these two components
of self-complexity (SC). The subsequent analyses were based
on combined samples for which the appropriate scores were
available (i.e., Study 1b and Study 1c samples).
To test the internal consistency of each of the self-
complexity measure, split-half reliability coefficients were
calculated, following the procedure of Rafaeli-Mor et al.
(1999). Instead of using a participant’s full trait sorting, the
relevant measures (NSA, OL, H, and SC) were computed
separately on two subsets of traits: the 30 odd-numbered traits
and the 30 even-numbered traits. Scores on each measure
within one subset of traits were then correlated with the re-
spective scores within the other half of the traits. The resulting
split-half correlations were corrected by the Spearman-Brown
formula to obtain split-half reliability estimates. The split-half
reliability estimate of NSAwas the highest (r=0.93), followed
by Linville’s H statistic (r=0.85), OL (r=0.69), and Sakaki’s
SC statistic (r=0.57). Overall, the split-half reliability coeffi-
cients were moderate or satisfactory, with the number of self-
aspects and the H statistic showing greater reliability. The
reliability estimates for Linville’s H measure and NSA
matched the values found by Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) in the
semi-random splitting. The reliability coefficient for OL was
higher than that reported by Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999) for the
valenced split, but remained below the coefficients that were
computed in the semi-random splitting.
The participants used an average of 15.44 (SD =6.53) trait
adjectives in their self-descriptions. The number of self-
aspects (NSA) in the present study ranged from 1 to 12, with
a mean of 4.90 (SD =1.93), overlap (OL) ranged from 0.00 to
1.00 with a mean of 0.17 (SD =0.15),4 the H statistic ranged
from 0.12 to 3.77 with a mean of 1.51 (SD =0.61), and the SC
statistic ranged from 3.08 to 1200.00 with a mean of 45.31
(SD =71.17). All data were checked for normality. The
4 A total of 17.3 % of the sample received a zero score on OL thereby
causing a divide by zero in further computation of the SC statistic.
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skewness of the variables ranged from 0.61 to 9.56, and their
kurtosis ranged from 0.61 to 136.09. Only the SC scores
showed a severe departure from normality based on Kline’s
(1998) rule (i.e., skew index absolute value <3; kurtosis index
absolute values <10). There were significant gender differ-
ences in the number of traits used, the number of self-aspects,
overlap, and Linville’s H statistic. Women (1) used more traits
to describe themselves (Mwomen =16.61 [SD =6.01] vs. Mmen
=13.78 [SD =6.89]), U =36987.00, Z=−6.14, p<0.001, r=
0.24, (2) identified more self-aspects (Mwomen =5.13 [SD
=1.81] vs. Mmen =4.58 [SD =2.06]), U =41133.50, Z=−4.47,
p<0.001, r=0.17, (3) had more interrelated self-aspects (M-
women =0.19 [SD =0.15] vs. Mmen =0.15 [SD =0.16]), U
=40603.00, Z=−4.25, p<0.001, r=0.17, and (4) had higher
H scores (Mwomen =1.62 [SD =0.57] vs. Mmen =1.34 [SD
=0.63]), U =36271.50, Z=−6.44, p<0.001, r=0.25, than
did men.
The simple correlation analysis revealed that the H statistic
had a positive association with the number of self-aspects (r=
0.59, p<0.001, r2=0.35), and thus appeared to reflect this
element of self-complexity quite well. This is consistent with
the findings of Linville (1987) and others (e.g., Brown and
Rafaeli 2007; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999). However, contrary to
Linville’s expectation that the H statistic will reflect high dis-
tinctiveness among roles, the H statistic and overlap were
positively related in this sample (r=0.27, p<0.001, r2=
0.08). Similar result was previously reported by Constantino
et al. (2006), Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999), and Luo et al. (2009).
We examined the scatterplot of the two variables and used
regression analysis to test the significance of a quadratic effect
for overlap. The analysis indicated that both linear and non-
linear effects were significant (β =0.15 and β=−0.13,
p<0.001, respectively), suggesting a concave down quadratic
trend in the relationship between overlap and the H scores.
This observation was even more important since the mean
level of overlap in our sample was very low (as was in
Rafaeli-Mor et al.’s study,M =0.13, Constantino et al.’s study,
M =0.17, and Luo and Watkins’ study, M =0.18) and lied in
the 1st theoretical quartile. A high percentage of 96 % of the
participants had overlap below, and merely 4 %, above, the
theoretical midpoint of 0.50. We used the theoretical midpoint
of 0.50 to separate high-OL and low-OL groups, and then
performed regression analysis for each group (controlling for
the effect of the number of self-aspects and the number of
attributes). As predicted, the H statistic was positively predict-
ed by overlap in the low-OL group (β =0.10, p<0.001), but
negatively predicted by overlap in the high-OL group (β=
−0.24, p<0.001). These findings suggest that there were cer-
tain circumstances in which greater overlap increased the val-
ue of H and other circumstances in which greater overlap
reduced its value. More precisely, the relationship between
Linville’s H measure and overlap followed an inverted U-
shaped function, but because most overlap values were
relatively small, the general relationship between them was
positive.
Consistent with the findings of Linville (1987), the SC
statistic was found to be positively related to the number of
self-aspects (r=0.36, p<0.001, r2=0.13) and negatively asso-
ciated with overlap (r=−0.41, p<0.001, r2=0.17). In agree-
ment with Brown and Rafaeli (2007), the two component
measures of self-complexity (the number of roles and overlap)
were unrelated (r=0.04, ns). But controversy emerged as the
H statistic and the SC statistic turned out to be unrelated (r=
0.05, ns). Since both measures theoretically capture the same
construct, this can be only explained by the difference in cal-
culation formula.
Additional analysis showed that the H statistic is problem-
atic for another reason. It was found to be strongly and posi-
tively linked to the number of trait adjectives used in the
person’s sort (r=0.97, p<0.001, r2=0.94). And this is not
without importance, since participants used positive self-
descriptors much more frequently than negative ones (χ2(1)
=6.25, p=0.012). This tendency reflects a form of self-
enhancement (e.g., Sedikides 1993). Expectedly, the H statis-
tic showed a stronger correlation with the number of positive
trait adjectives (r=0.90, p<0.001, r2=0.81) than with the
number of negative trait adjectives (r=0.56, p<0.001, r2=
0.32). The difference between the correlation coefficients
was significant (z=14.88, p<0.001). This turned out to be true
for NSA (r=0.44 and r=0.25, z=3.96, p<0.001) and OL (r=
0.25 and r=0.05, z=3.71, p<0.001) as well. On the other
hand, the same correlation analysis performed for the SC sta-
tistic revealed that neither the total number of chosen adjec-
tives nor the number of positive or negative adjectives were
related to the SC statistic (r=0.04, r=0.02, and r=0.05, ns,
respectively).5
To ascertain these relations and determine the most impor-
tant predictors of both Linville’s H and Sakaki’s SC statistic,
simultaneous multiple regression analyses were conducted
with the number of self-aspects, overlap, and the number of
chosen adjectives as predictors and either the H statistic or the
5 We performed additional regression analyses to examine the potential
confounding of quantity with evaluation. Both the number of chosen
adjectives and the proportion of positive traits chosen (PPAT) were en-
tered to assess whether they uniquely contributed to the prediction of the
dependent variables. The results showed that the number of attributes
uniquely contributed to the prediction of NSA (β=0.47, p<0.001), OL
(β=0.25, p<0.001), and the H score (β=0.97, p<0.001), and the propor-
tion of positive attributes uniquely predicted OL (β=0.11, p<0.01) and
the H score (β=0.03, p<0.05). Sakaki’s SC statistic was unrelated to any
of these two variables (β=0.03 and β=−0.04, ns, respectively). It is
worth noting that the richness of self-depiction and its favorability were
not exactly independent of each other, as demonstrated by a significant
correlation between them (r=−0.18, p<0.001). Moreover, in the model of
the H score, the interaction term of NAT and PPAT appeared to be signif-
icant (F(1, 648) =8.63, p<0.01). The effect of the number of traits on the
H score was consistently positive and increased with increasing propor-
tion of positive traits.
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SC statistic as the dependent variable. Squared semipartial
correlations were calculated to estimate the unique contribu-
tion of each predictor to the variance in self-complexity
scores. We also tested for multicollinearity using a rule of
thumb associated with the variance inflation factor (VIF <5).
As can be seen in Table 2, NAS, OL, and NAT were sig-
nificant unique predictors of self-complexity, regardless the
measure that was used. The number of chosen adjectives
emerged as the strongest (and positive) predictor of Linville’s
H statistic (β=0.87, p<0.001). Positive associations between
the H statistic and both number of roles and overlap held even
when controlling for all the other predictor variables (β=0.19,
p<0.001 and β=0.06, p<0.001, respectively). The number of
self-aspects was the strongest (and positive) predictor (β=
0.42, p<0.001) of Sakaki’s SC statistic, closely followed by
overlap (β=−0.40, p<0.001), which remained negatively as-
sociated with the SC statistic. The regressionmodel (F(3, 642)
=5765.86, p<0.001) accounted for 96 % of the variance in the
H score, with NAT explaining 57.5 % of the variance, NSA
approximately 3 %, and OL an additional 0.3 %, as reflected
by the squared semipartial correlation. Thus both NSA and
OL played only a minor role in self-complexity indicated by
the H statistic. For Sakaki’s SC statistic, the regression model
accounted for 31 % of the variance (F(3, 530) =77.80,
p<0.001), with OL and NSA explaining 15.5 % and 13 %
of the variance, respectively. The remaining 1.6 % was attrib-
utable to NTA.6
The above results suggest that the SC statistic serves
as a more adequate measure of the self-complexity as
conceptualized by Linville (1987). However, since the
equation for computing the SC statistic may cause a
divide by zero error, using the two-component approach
and analyzing NSA and OL separately seems to be most
suitable. It is also worth noting that Linville’s H statis-
tic, reflecting predominantly the quantity of self-descrip-
tions, constitutes the measure of differentiation, and not
self-complexity, according to Zajonc’s (1960) original
taxonomy.
Measures of Self-Concept Differentiation
The following analyses aimed at providing validity in-
formation on the Self-Incoherence Scale and exploring
the convergence among different measures designed to
assess self-concept differentiation: the average standard
deviation of trait ratings across roles (SCDSD),the aver-
age correlation among the roles (SCDR), and the pro-
portion of unshared variance among the roles (SCDVAR).
The analyses in this section were based on combined
samples for which the appropriate scores were available
(i.e., Study 1a and Study 1b samples).
Internal consistency reliability of the scale was exam-
ined. The standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of
the composite index, based on the intercorrelations
among trait-specific standard deviations, was 0.83. The
mean corrected item-total correlation for the 7 traits was
r=0.57, indicating that those participants who were var-
iable on one trait tended to be variable on the others.
Although the reliability coefficient was slightly lower
than that of the original study of Styła et al. (2010, α
=0.90), it was nevertheless acceptable.
The self-differentiation scores calculated from an average
standard deviation (SCDSD) in the present study ranged from
0.00 to 3.03, with a mean of 0.98 (SD =0.36), the index based
on an average correlation (SCDR) ranged from 0.10 to 1.00,
with a mean of 0.42 (SD =0.13), and the index derived from
factor analysis (SCDVAR) ranged from 0.00 to 67.92, with a
Table 2 Summary of multiple
regression analysis with either the
H or SC statistic as the dependent
variable
Linville’s H statistic Sakaki’s SC statistic
Variable β t β t
NSA 0.19 22.76*** 0.42 10.01***
OL 0.06 7.84*** −0.40 −10.90***
NAT 0.87 101.46*** −0.14 −3.46***
Model R2=0.96, F(3, 642) =5765.86, p<0.001 R2=0.31, F(3, 530) =77.80, p<0.001
N=652
NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, NAT number of trait adjectives
*** p <0.001
6 We also employed Hayes (2012) bootstrapping PROCESS tool for
SPSS to assess the direct and indirect effects of NSA and OL on either
the H or SC scores, with NAT as a mediating variable. The remaining
component of self-complexity was used as a covariate and partialed out of
all paths in the respective model. A total of 1000 re-samples of the data
were executed using Hayes’ SPSS macro. The confidence intervals for
the indirect effects of NSA and OL on the H scores via NAT did not
include zero (estimate =0.12, 95 % CI =0.09, 0.14 and estimate =0.73,
95 % CI =0.40, 1.02 for NSA and OL, respectively). Thus, the number of
traits mediated the relationships of the number of self-aspects and overlap
with the H score. The indirect effect of NSA on the SC score was found to
be significant (estimate=−2.89, 95 % CI=−6.70, −0.87). However, there
was no indication of a significant indirect effect of overlap on the SC
scores through the number of traits (estimate=−4.07, 95 % CI=−18.78,
1.56).
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mean of 45.77 (SD =11.07).7 For all three variables, skewness
and kurtosis were within acceptable limits (skewness:−0.77 to
1.18; kurtosis: 0.75 to 3.67). No significant gender differences
were observed.
The zero-order correlation revealed that the SCD index
based on an average standard deviation was only weakly cor-
related with Campbell et al.’s (2003) index (r=−0.27,
p<0.001, r2=0.07) and Block’s (1961) index (r=0.27,
p<0.001, r2=0.07). These findings are contrary to those by
Donahue et al. (1993) who reported high degree of conver-
gence between alternative indexes. In accordance with expec-
tations, Campbell et al.’s (2003) and Block’s (1961) indexes
were strongly associated (r=−0.95, p<0.001, r2=0.90).
Additional concerns raised with respect to the fact that all
personality traits included in the Self-Incoherence Scale were
positively valenced. Thus, it is possible that the SCD score
represents the consistency of endorsing desirable traits rather
than self-concept differentiation, as conceptualized in the lit-
erature (Donahue et al. 1993). To test this hypothesis, we
compared the SCD scores in two groups: participants who
rated themselves highly on the 7 positive traits and those,
who claimed they lacked them. For each participant, we aver-
aged their ratings on each trait across the five roles. The com-
pared groups were composed of participants who obtained
extremely low and extremely high scores on a given trait. A
standard deviation criterion was used as cut-off point. The
Mann–Whitney U tests showed there were significant differ-
ences in trait variability scores between the two groups on
every personality trait analyzed (effect size range r=0.47 to
0.78, average r=0.58). Specifically, participants who rated a
positive personality trait as highly descriptive of themselves
received lower standard deviation scores for that trait, indicat-
ing a more stable self-concept (see Table 3). Similar results
were obtained in correlation analysis of mean trait rating with
cross-role standard deviation for the respective trait. The cor-
relation coefficients ranged from r=−0.32 to r=−0.54, with
the average coefficient being approximately −0.39 (p<0.001,
range of r2=0.10 to 0.29, average r2=0.16).
We also performed Mann–Whitney U tests to compare all
three SCD indexes between participants who generally
viewed themselves positively and those who evaluated them-
selves more negatively. The two groups were obtained simply
by averaging participants’ ratings for all 7 personality traits. A
standard deviation criterion was used as cut-off point. Once
again, as shown in Table 4, self-differentiation index based on
an average standard deviation was found to be associated with
a tendency to ascribe desirable traits to the self (U =3025.50,
p<0.001, r=0.57).8 The Pearson correlation coefficient of
these two variables was r=−0.40 and was statistically signif-
icant (p<0.001, r2=0,16). This effect, however, was not ob-
served for the other two SCD indexes.
The above results suggest that there is varying correspon-
dence between alternative ways of measuring self-concept
differentiation, and, more importantly, that self-concept differ-
entiation – operationalized as the average standard deviation –
may not be independent of the contents of the self-concept
(see also Locke 2006).
Relationship Between Self-Complexity and Self-Concept
Differentiation
We examined whether measures of self-concept structure,
reflecting differentiation and integration (unity), were related
to one another. These analyses were based on Study 1b sample
data.
Correlation analysis (see Table 5) between self-complexity,
its components and self-concept differentiation revealed a
weak, negative association between overlap and SCD index
based on an average standard deviation (r=−0.13, p=0.004,
r2=0.02). Considering the dependence of SCDSD on mean
trait rating (cf. Tables 3 and 4), we decided to examine this
result further. The zero-order correlation showed that along
with OL and SCDSD being correlated to each other, both were
significantly correlated to the mean trait rating (r=0.12, p=
0.005 and r=−0.40, p<0.001, respectively). To test for the
possible confounding effect of the mean trait rating, a hierar-
chical regression was used in which the SCDSD score was
regressed on overlap (Step 1), and participants’ mean rating
for personality traits (Step 2). After entering the mean trait
rating in Step 2, the model explained 16.5 % of the variance
7 For a total of 7.2 % of the sample, the SCDR and SCDVAR scores could
not be calculated because of zero within variation for more than one role.
Table 3 Trait variability in individuals with high and low ratings on





Variable M (SD) M (SD) U Z Effect size r
Trait 1 1.35 (0.64) 0.77 (0.36) 4093.50*** −7.65 0.47
Trait 2 1.33 (0.62) 0.57 (0.35) 2711.50*** −10.51 0.63
Trait 3 1.27 (0.68) 0.22 (0.23) 707.50*** −12.21 0.78
Trait 4 1.21 (0.69) 0.57 (0.36) 3179.00*** −7.49 0.48
Trait 5 0.99 (0.57) 0.39 (0.27) 1600.00*** −9.59 0.65
Trait 6 1.17 (0.65) 0.61 (0.38) 3712.50*** −7.667 0.48
Trait 7 1.25 (0.65) 0.50 (0.42) 3537.50*** −9.606 0.57
N=868
*** p<0.001
8 The comparison of all three groups (low, medium, and high mean trait
ratings) led to the same conclusions. According to Kruskal-Wallis tests,
there was a significant effect of the mean self-rating classification on the
SCDSD score (χ2(2) =129.62, p<0.001, ER
2=0.15). Subsequent pairwise
comparisons, performed using the Mann–Whitney U test, showed that all
three groups were significantly different from each other with respect to
the SCDSD scores (p<0.01).
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in the SCDSD score (ΔR
2=0.15, F(1, 515) =92.23, p<0.001).
The mean trait rating emerged as a significant predictor (β=
−0.39, p<0.001), whereas the effect of overlap was no longer
significant (β=−0.08, ns).9
No further associations between measures of self-
complexity and measures of self concept differentiation were
found, suggesting that they are, to a large extent, independent
constructs. A similar conclusion was drawn by Campbell et al.
(2003), and Lutz and Ross (2003).
Identity Correlates of Self-Complexity and Self-Concept
Differentiation
Traditionally, a stable and coherent personal identity is con-
sidered to be essential for psychological health and adaptive
functioning. According to Erikson (1980), the subjective ex-
perience of personal identity actually gives rise to a precon-
scious sense of personal well-being. We examined the self
structure–identity relationship, operationalizing identity
through measures of identity processes and identity senses.
Basic statistical description of identity variables in com-
bined sample is presented in Table 6. The levels of skewness
and kurtosis exhibited by our data were below those that Kline
(1998) specifies as problematic (skewness: −0.40 to 0.25; kur-
tosis: −0.25 to 0.26). An analysis of gender differences by
means of Mann–Whitney U test indicated that men had a
higher sense of inner contents (U =107833.50, Z=−2.47, p=
0.013, r =0.08), uniqueness (U =100746.00, Z=−4.00,
p<0.001, r=0.13), their own boundaries (U =96659.00, Z=
−4.96, p<0.001, r=0.16), and self-worth (U =94079.00, Z=
−4.76, p<0.001, r=0.15), than women. Moreover, men, as
compared to women, had higher scores on overall sense of
identity (U =99912.50, Z=−4.27, p<0.001, r=0.14). With
respect to identity processes, women endorsed identity accom-
modation more than men (U =1098.00, Z=−4.30, p<0.001,
r=0.03), and men scored higher on identity balance than
women (U =1496.00, Z=−2.23, p=0.026, r=0.02).
Table 7 contains the zero-order correlations between self-
complexity, self concept differentiation, and identity mea-
sures. All observed correlations were rather weak (r ≤0.34)
and seemingly inconsistent. Of all self-complexity measures,
relatively the strongest correlation emerged between the H
statistic and identity balance (Study 1c: r=0.31, p<0.001,
r2=0.10). Linville’s measure was also related to most of the
identity senses (average r=0.11, average r2=0.02) and global
sense of identity (average r=0.16, average r2=0.03). These
correlations were all positive with the exception of the one
with sense of one’s own boundaries. Overlap showed signifi-
cant associations with some of the identity senses (average r=
0.02, average r2=0.01) and global sense of identity (average
r=0.02, average r2=0.01). Though the direction and signifi-
cance of these associations was not consistent across the two
studies. The only significant correlation of the number of self-
aspects was a negative one with sense of one’s own bound-
aries (Study 1b: r=−0.12, r2=0.01), and the only significant
correlation of Sakaki’s SC statistic was a negative one with
identity accommodation (Study 1c: r=−0.21, r2=0.05). Neg-
ative associations emerged between SCDSD and most of the
identity senses (average r=−0.18, average r2=0.05) and glob-
al sense of identity (average r=−0.24, average r2=0.07).
Clearly weaker correlations were found between identity
senses and SCDR (average r=0.03, average r
2=0.004) and
SCDVAR (average r=−0.04, average r2=0.005). Both of these
self-concept differentiation indices were uncorrelated with the
global sense of identity score (on average, r=0.04, r2=0.002
and r=−0.06, r2=0.004, respectively).
To ascertain the extent to which each of the self complexity
and self-concept differentiation measures exhibited associa-
tions with identity variables that were independent of their
associations with other variables, regression analyses were
conducted. Identity scores were regressed on self-structure
variables that were available in the data set. Due to the fact
that specific identity senses were correlated with one another
(average r=0.41, p<0.001), we only used the global sense of
identity scores. Also, there were a number of cases for which
the SC scores and scores on the two SCD indices based on the
9 Bootstrapping analysis (Hayes 2012) was used to test the mediating role
of the mean trait rating. A total of 1000 re-samples of the data were
executed using Hayes’ macro. As zero was not in the 95 % confidence
interval for the indirect effect, we can conclude that it was indeed signif-
icant (estimate=−0.12, 95 % CI=−0.24, −0.03).
Table 4 Self-concept
differentiation difference between
individuals with high and low
mean ratings
Low ratings High ratings
Variable M (SD) M (SD) U Z Effect size r
SCDSD 1.13 (0.45) 0.69 (0.24) 3025.50*** −9.33 0.57
SCDR 0.44 (0.14) 0.44 (0.13) 6268.50 −0.27 0.02
SCDVAR 45.21 (12.57) 43.89 (11.57) 5909.00 −0.99 0.07
N=868
SCDSD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, SCDR average correlation among the roles,
SCDVAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles
*** p<0.001
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cross-role correlation matrix could not be obtained because of
calculation problems (i.e., a division by zero error and an
undefined correlation with zero variance). Since the missing
cases may have caused the samples to be biased, we excluded
these measures from the regression analyses described be-
low.10 Lastly, since some of the self-structural measures have
been shown to be sensitive to variations in self-contents var-
iables (e.g., the proportion of positive traits adjectives used in
the sort and the mean trait rating), we performed regressions
including them as predictors to control for their respective
effects.
In all models, multicollinearity was examined to determine
if any of the independent or control variables were a signifi-
cant function of each other. As expected, since the H score and
the number of traits were very highly correlated, the tolerances
for these variables were very low and the VIFs exceed the
value of 10. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem,
only the number of traits has been included in the analysis.
The tolerance and the variance inflation factors in the final
regression analyses were well within the acceptable range
(tolerance >0.20, VIF <5).
In general, control variables (i.e., related to richness and
favorability of self-depiction) were more consistent predictors
of personal identity than variables related to self-concept
structure (see Table 8).11 Individuals with a strong sense of
identity and who were identity balanced were more likely to
have very rich self-defining aspects and to describe them-
selves with more positive attributes.
With this in mind, it is possible to interpret psychologically
the obtained results. The global sense of identity was nega-
tively predicted by SCDSD (Study 1a: β=−0.22, p<0.001),
showing that a differentiated self-concept was associated with
a weakening of a sense of identity. Approximately 4 % of the
GSI variance was explained by SCDSD. OL emerged as a
significant predictor of IAS (Study 1c: β=−0.19, p=0.046),
suggesting that a unified self-structure was related to lesser
use of assimilation, probably since there was hardly any
discrepancy that needed to be resolved. About 3.5 % of the
variance in the IAS scores was attributable to OL.
Overall, these correlation and regression findings would
support the assumption that a sense of identity is related to
coherence across self-aspects rather than their complexity and
diversity. At the same time, they suggest that certain relation-
ships of structural variables with well-being outcomes could
be explained by content-based variables.
Cognitive Correlates of Self-Complexity and Self-Concept
Differentiation
Drawing on the ideas of positive psychology, we posit that
psychological well-being includes the development of various
reflective and self-reflective capacities. Therefore, in this sec-
tion, we address the issue of adaptive significance of structural
aspects of self by exploring their relationships with need for
cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge. The fol-
lowing analyses were based on Study 1b sample data.
In our sample, the scores on need for cognition ranged from
56.00 to 175.00 (M =127.39, SD =17.92), on reflection ranged
from 1.00 to 5.00 (M =3.26, SD =0.77), and for integrative
self-knowledge ranged from 0.00 to 4.00 (M =2.36, SD
=0.63). For the current data set, the skewness of the variables
ranged from −0.18 to 0.09, and the kurtosis ranged from −0.16
to 0.38. These estimates did not identify any serious violations
of normality. To examine gender differences, for each vari-
able, an independent Mann–Whitney U test was computed
comparing the male and female scores. Women (M =3.21,
SD =0.76) scored significantly lower than men (M =3.34,
SD =0.77) on reflection (U =31578.00, Z=−2.12, p=0.034,
r=0.09). In terms of other variables, no significant gender
differences were observed.
The observed correlations between measures of self-
complexity and self-concept differentiation, and thinking dis-
positions are given in Table 9. Need for cognition correlated
10 In each of the samples, we made a series of comparisons between
participants for whom we had data and those for whom we did not, to
assess whether there was any notable difference between them on any of
the outcome measure. Comparisons were performed using the Mann–
Whitney U-test. Significant differences were found between those for
whom we obtained the SCDVAR and SCDR scores and those for whom
we did not in relation to global sense of identity (Study 1a: U =1784.00,
p<0.01, r=0.15); and between those for whomwe obtained the SC scores
and those for whom we did not in relation to accommodation (Study 1c:
U =436.50, p<0.05, r=0.19) and balance (Study 1c: U =299.50,
p<0.001, r=0.30).
11 The PROCESSmacro (Hayes 2012) was used to test for mediation and
moderation effects. We found evidence for mediation of the relationship
between self-concept differentiation and global sense of identity, through
the mean trait ratings (estimate=−0.11, 95 % CI=−0.17, −0.06 and esti-
mate=−0.10, 95 % CI=−0.14, −0.06 for the indirect effects of SCDSD in
Study 1a and Study 1b, respectively).
Table 5 Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity and self
concept differentiation
Variable OL H SC SCDSD SCDR SCDVAR
NSA 0.10* 0.56*** 0.29*** −0.03 −0.01 0.02
OL – 0.33*** −0.54*** −0.13** 0.04 −0.04
H – 0.03 −0.08 0.03 0.00
SC – 0.09 −0.10 0.08
SCDSD – −0.28*** 0.28***
SCDR – −0.95***
N=521
NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity
index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCDSD average standard devi-
ation of trait ratings across roles, SCDR average correlation among the
roles, SCDVAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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with all three indices of self-concept differentiation. The stron-
gest association was observed between NCS and SCDSD (r=
−0.29, p<0.001, r2=0.09). Reflection correlated with the
number of self-aspects, Linville’s H statistic, and self-
concept differentiation index calculated from an average stan-
dard deviation. The latter association was the strongest (r=
−0.18, p<0.001, r2=0.03). Finally, integrative self-
knowledge correlated with overlap, the H and the SC statis-
tics, and self-concept differentiation index based on an aver-
age standard deviation. The association of greatest magnitude
was between ISK and OL (r=0.21, p<0.001, r2=0.04). It
should be pointed out that all of the correlation coefficients
were rather small, even when statistically significant; the larg-
est explained about 9 % of the variance.
Although the zero-order correlations are instructive, they
may be misleading. Therefore, a subsequent series of regres-
sion analyses was performed to examine the independent ef-
fects of measure of self-complexity and self-concept differen-
tiation on each cognitive variable. The rationale guiding in-
clusion of the predictor variables was similar to the analyses in
the previous section. Sakaki’s SC measure, the SCDVAR in-
dex, and the SCDR index were excluded to avoid bias in the
sample and to retain sample size.12 Linville’s H measure was
excluded to avoid multicollinearity. Three variables related to
richness and favorability of self-concept were included in the
models to control for their potential effects. The beta weights
(standardized regression coefficients) are reported in Table 10.
The obtained results indicated, again, that the control var-
iables were more strongly related to thinking dispositions than
were the main predictors. Individuals who gave more elabo-
rated self-descriptions and expressed more favorable self-
evaluations used adaptive cognitive thinking to a greater de-
gree. Of the included structural features of the self-concept,
self-concept differentiation emerged as a significant predictor
of need for cognition (β=−0.19, p<0.001) as well as reflec-
tion (β=−0.16, p ≤0.001), and integrative self-knowledge
(β=−0.11, p=0.016), accounting for, respectively, 3 %, 2 %,
and 1 % of the criterion variance. These effects suggested that
active cognitive processing accompanied less differentiated
self-structure. Overlap was independently associated with
integrative self-knowledge (β =0.16, p<0.001), showing that
a tendency to integrate past, present, and desired future self-
experience into a meaningful whole was directly linked to a
unified self-structure. The predictive value of overlap for in-
tegrative self-knowledge was approximately 2.4 %.13
Altogether, the obtained results indicated that the thinking
dispositions of interest were not substantially predicted from
the included structural features of the self-concept. Although
relatively small in magnitude, these effects suggested that en-
gaging in functionally adaptive cognitive processing was as-
sociated with a more coherent self-concept.
General Discussion
Individual differences in the self-concept structure have been a
topic of considerable interest for at least three decades and
have been debated as to their validity and adaptive signifi-
cance. Thus, in this paper, we tackled issues related to the
validity of operationalization and adaptive value of self-
complexity and self-concept differentiation. The results of
the present investigation can be summed up as follows:
1. The obtained results suggest that both singular indices of
self-complexity – Linville’s H statistic and Sakaki’s SC
statistic – are lacking, although for different reasons.
Correlation and regression analyses showed that the H
score was positively associated with the number of self-
aspects as well as with the overlap among them. Thus, in
contrast to Linville’s (1985, 1987) prediction, not only numer-
ous self-aspects but also more role overlap strengthen one’s H
score. The effect of overlap proved particularly inconsistent
across different studies, ranging from positive (e.g.,
Constantino et al. 2006; Luo and Watkins 2009; Rafaeli-Mor
et al. 1999) to even nonsignificant (e.g., Brown and Rafaeli
2007; Engįn 2004; Heath 2011; Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg
2002), with no consensus on its association to Linville’s H
measure. These potentially conflicting findings could all be
correct. Inspection of our data indicated that the relationship
between the H statistic and overlap was, in fact, inverted U-
shaped (see also Luo and Watkins 2008, 2009; Luo et al.
2009). That is, an increase in overlap initially increases the
H score, but when overlap exceeds a certain threshold, the H
score decreases. Thus, depending on range of overlap values
observed, the H statistic function takes on a different shape.
The most possible explanation for our overall positive result is
that the range of overlap in our data was sufficiently low, so
that we did not observe the decrease in the H score – only the
increase. The same explanation could account for previous
failures (e.g., Constantino et al. 2006; Luo and Watkins
2009; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999) to identify the theoretically
assumed negative effect of overlap on Linville’s H measure.
12 There were significant differences with regard to the cognitive vari-
ables among participants for whom we had complete data and those for
whom we did not, suggesting that a bias would be present. Those for
whom we did not obtain the SCDVAR and SCDR scores had lower levels
of integrative self-knowledge than did those for whomwe could calculate
both scores (U =9722.50, p<0.05, r=0.11). The same was true in case of
the SC scores (U =16487.00, p<0.01, r=0.13).
13 Using PROCESS bootstrapping macro (Hayes 2012), we found that
the effect of self-concept differentiation on need for cognition as well as
on integrative self-knowledge was mediated by the mean trait ratings
(estimate=−3.89, 95 % CI=−5.79, −2.42 and estimate=−0.09, 95 %
CI=−0.15, −0.04 for the indirect effect of SCDSD on NCS and ISK,
respectively). Also, the number of traits used in the sort served as a
significant mediator between overlap and integrative self-knowledge (es-
timate =0.13, 95 % CI =0.03, 0.28 for the indirect effect of OL).
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Moreover, the H statistic turned out to be influenced by the
number of traits used in self-definition. In fact, the total num-
ber of traits used in the trait-sort task appeared to be the most
important predictive factor for the H score, and a significant
mediator in the NSA–H and OL–H relationships. Taken to-
gether, these data indicate that Linville’s H statistic, at best,
could be considered an indirect measure of role quantity or
simply a measure of the number of traits endorsed (see also
Zajonc 1960). Corresponding conclusions were drawn by
Locke (2003), Rafaeli-Mor et al. (1999), and Solomon and
Haaga (2003). In addition, since the H statistic is highly sen-
sitive to the number of traits, and people tend to ascribe far
more positive traits than negative traits to the self, the H sta-
tistic will somewhat reflect self-esteem. This was previously
recognized by Woolfolk et al. (1995) and Campbell et al.
(2003), who found that self-complexity was influenced by
the evaluative composition of the attributes sorted (i.e., the
ratio of positive to negative attributes). Our analyses revealed
that both component measures of self-complexity were also
affected by the number of traits used, although to a much
lesser extent than the H statistic. In addition, overlap was also
found to be dependent on the favorability of the self-concept.
This agrees with the results reported by Campbell et al. (2003)
for the average correlation among self-aspects. One important
question which we should address at this point is, whether we
should interpret the obtained results as an indication of a pos-
itive self-complexity–self-esteem relationship or as a result of
the method of calculation. While not entirely conclusive, our
data, and those cited above, point to the second conclusion.
As for Sakaki’s SC statistic, it was found to be related
positively to the number of self-aspects utilized and negatively
to the overlap among these self-aspects, as Linville argued that
it should. The amount of the SC statistic variance captured by
the number of traits used in the sort was so small as to suggest
that it probably was not meaningful. However, the mathemat-
ical formula of the SC statistic can potentially require division
by zero and thus may yield uninterpretable results. Surprising
as it may seem, neither Sakaki (2004, 2006) nor other authors
that used this index (e.g., Borawski 2011) commented on this
issue.14
Given the above and in agreement with Rafaeli-Mor and
colleagues (1999), the two component measures of self-
complexity, rather than singular measures, emerge as a more
reasonable alternative in self-complexity assessment. Results
showed that the component measures of self-complexity were
uncorrelated with each other, thus providing support for their
functional independence and for the two-dimensional nature
of self-complexity, comprising both differentiation and a form
of integration.
2. The results found that measures of self-concept differenti-
ation based on an average standard deviation of trait
ratings across roles and derived from correlations be-
tween role identities were not convergent. Moreover, each
of them share certain limitations.
Although Campbell et al.’s (2003) and Block’s (1961) in-
dices of self-concept differentiation were strongly
intercorrelated, contrary to Donahue et al.’s (1993) finding,
they had a weaker correlation with the measure recommended
by Styła et al. (2010). We also found evidence for the non-
convergence of these indices through an examination of their
patterns of relationships with identity and cognitive variables.
In particular, associations between indices derived from cross-
role correlations and these other variables were considerably
weaker and less consistent.
Furthermore, the SCDSD index turned out to be biased,
since participants rating positive traits as highly descriptive
of themselves obtained considerably lower self-concept dif-
ferentiation scores. Hence, it could be argued that the SCDSD
index reflects self-esteem (or self-esteem enhancement) in ad-
dition to self-concept differentiation. Similar concerns have
been raised previously by Baird et al. (2006). Their studies
provided evidence that the cross-role standard deviation con-
flate mean-level information with variability in trait expres-
sion. Baird et al. (2006) strongly suggested that this associa-
tion is attributable to the constraints on the bivariate distribu-
tion and not to any underlying psychological process. They
also pointed out that the relation of mean level and variability
of traits will be more evident if the distribution of means is
skewed. Because the Self-Incoherence Scale is restricted to
positively valenced traits, and people generally view them-
selves positively, the means distribution in our data was
skewed toward higher values (Sk=−0.49, SES =0.08). Thus,
in regression analyses we controlled for trait mean levels and
examined whether variability per se predicted well-being
outcomes.
As to indices based on cross-role correlation matrix, they
can only reflect the covariance rather than consistency be-
tween role-based personalities, meaning that they do not ex-
actly reflect the theoretically defined construct of self-concept
differentiation (Donahue et al. 1993). Moreover, as such they
are sensitive to the within role variance, and thence any role
identity that has no within variation has to be dropped from
calculations or the indices remain undefined in such
14 In a private correspondence, Michiko Sakaki herself has suggested the
use of overlap and the number of aspects participants reported as alterna-
tive measures of self-complexity. One strategy, that we felt might be
useful for overcoming division by zero would be adding a small constant
(for example, 0.001) to the divisor. The majority of previous findings
were replicated when this correction was used, except that the correlation
between accommodation and the SC score was lost (Study 1c, r=0.18,
ns), whereas the correlation between balance and the SC score was sig-
nificant (Study 1c, r=−0.27, p<0.01). However, in the simultaneous re-
gression, the SC score was unrelated to either accommodation or balance
(β=0.14 and β=−0.10, ns, respectively). Full results are available on
request.
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circumstances (see also Baird et al. 2006; Locke 2006). The
chance of this occurring is lower when the number of self-
descriptive traits is greater. However, with only seven self-
descriptors, as in the Self-Incoherence Scale, this became an
Table 7 Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity, self-concept differentiation, and identity
Sample SIC SU SOB SC SCT SSW GSI IAS IAC IBL
NSA
Study 1b 0.03 −0.02 −0.12** 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.00
Study 1c −0.01 0.06 0.07 −0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05 −0.01 −0.07 0.08
OL
Study 1b 0.08 0.01 −0.05 0.09* 0.16*** 0.09* 0.09*
Study 1c −0.09 −0.08 0.10 0.03 −0.07 −0.06 −0.04 −0.15 −0.08 0.06
H
Study 1b 0.11* 0.06 −0.09* 0.06 0.11* 0.14*** 0.09*
Study 1c 0.14 0.22* 0.15 0.06 0.17 0.23* 0.23* 0.10 −0.05 0.31***
SC
Study 1b 0.01 −0.06 −0.02 −0.01 −0.06 0.00 −0.03
Study 1c 0.13 0.02 −0.12 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.06 −0.04 −0.21* 0.06
SCDSD
Study 1a −0.34*** 0.01 −0.13* −0.39*** −0.34*** −0.31*** −0.34***
Study 1b −0.18*** −0.02 −0.01 −0.19*** −0.11* −0.12** −0.15***
SCDR
Study 1a 0.06 0.00 −0.04 0.13* 0.11* 0.02 0.06
Study 1b −0.01 −0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 −0.02 0.01
SCDVAR
Study 1a −0.09 0.01 0.02 −0.14* −0.13* −0.05 −0.08
Study 1b −0.01 0.04 −0.06 −0.07 −0.06 0.01 −0.03
NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCDSD average standard deviation of
trait ratings across roles, SCDR average correlation among the roles, SCDVAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles, SIC sense of having inner
contents, SU sense of uniqueness, SOB sense of one’s own boundaries, SC sense of coherence, SCT sense of continuity over time, SSW sense of self-
worth, GSI global sense of identity, IAS assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance
*** p≤0.001, ** p≤0.01* p≤0.05
Table 6 Descriptive statistics
and gender differences for
identity senses and identity
processes
Variable Mtotal (SD) Mwomen (SD) Mmen (SD) U Z Effect size r
SIC 2.18 (0.48) 2.15 (0.46) 2.22 (0.51) 107,833.50* −2.47 0.08
SU 1.71 (0.48) 1.66 (0.49) 1.78 (0.47) 100,746.00*** −4.00 0.13
SOB 1.50 (0.45) 1.44 (0.44) 1.60 (0.44) 96,659.00*** −4.96 0.16
SC 1.95 (0.46) 1.93 (0.44) 1.97 (0.49) 112,046.00 −1.55 0.05
SCT 1.90 (0.41) 1.88 (0.40) 1.92 (0.44) 113,717.00 −1.14 0.04
SSW 1.95 (0.49) 1.89 (0.48) 2.04 (0.49) 94,079.00*** −4.76 0.15
GSI 1.86 (0.33) 1.82 (0.31) 1.92 (0.34) 99,912.50*** −4.27 0.14
IAS 3.59 (0.87) 3.63 (0.91) 3.58 (0.84) 1943.00 −0.16 0.00
IAC 3.79 (1.08) 4.20 (1.05) 3.34 (0.94) 1098.00*** −4.30 0.03
IBL 4.90 (0.93) 4.74 (0.80) 5.08 (1.05) 1496.00* −2.23 0.02
Descriptive statistics for identity senses are based on 1001 participants; descriptive statistics for identity processes
are based on 127 participants
SIC sense of having inner contents, SU sense of uniqueness, SOB sense of one’s own boundaries, SC sense of
coherence, SCT sense of continuity over time, SSW sense of self-worth, GSI global sense of identity, IAS
assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance
*** p<0.001, * p<0.05
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important issue. Regardless, this source of variance is not even
relevant to what Donahue and colleagues (1993) have concep-
tualized as self-concept differentiation.
3. The examination of relationships between measures of
self-complexity and self-concept differentiation did not
reveal any evident links between those seemingly similar
constructs.
Our overall results were comparable to those previously
reported (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003; Constantino et al. 2006;
Lutz and Ross 2003), as we found no unique associations
between measures of self-complexity and self-concept differ-
entiation. Correlation and regression analyses of self-com-
plexity, its components, and self-concept differentiation on
identity and cognitive variables yielded rather inconclusive
results (see later in the text). Still, it seems safe to say that
the patterns of associations for different structural features
were neither similar, nor opposite. These findings support
the postulate that complexity of the self-concept and self-
concept differentiation are not the same phenomena. More-
over, since the two integration measures, namely overlap
and self-concept differentiation, also appeared not to be
uniquely related to one another, we might need to assume that
they reflect different forms of integration. The above observa-
tions can also be understood in terms of the nature of the
technique used. As noted in the introduction, the self-
complexity task allows individuals to define their self-
aspects in idiosyncratic ways, whereas in the self-concept dif-
ferentiation task participants are constrained by limited and
predefined roles. As pointed out by some authors (e.g.,
Constantino et al. 2006; Koch and Shepperd 2004; Lutz and
Ross 2003), this distinction is important in that the former task
may draw participants’ attention to more pleasant feelings of
social specialization (a flexibility–rigidity dimension), where-
as the latter task may promote focusing attention on rather
unpleasant feelings of wearing many masks (an integration–
fragmentation dimension).
4. There were some direct associations of measures of self-
complexity and self-concept differentiation with measures
of identity and active cognitive processing. However,
these associations were more limited than expected, and
were influenced by the self-contents related variables.
The focus of the current paper was to consider the relations
between structural characteristics of the self-concept and two
broad aspects of psychological adjustment: personal identity
and thinking dispositions. The former was operationalized in
terms of identity senses (Pilarska 2012, 2014a) and identity
Table 8 Summary of beta
weights for regression analyses
with identity measures as the
dependent variable
GSI IAS IAC IBL
Source Study 1a Study 1b Study 1c Study 1c Study 1c Study 1c
NSA −0.07 −0.11 −0.11 −0.12 −0.10
OL 0.00 −0.12 −0.19* −0.07 −0.03
SCDSD −0.22*** −0.03
NAT 0.11* 0.39*** 0.19 −0.05 0.44***
























NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, SCDSD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles, NAT
number of trait adjectives,PPAT proportion of positive trait adjectives,MTRmean trait rating,GSI global sense of
identity, IAS assimilation, IAC accommodation, IBL balance
*** p≤0.001,** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 9 Correlation matrix of measures of self-complexity, self-
concept differentiation, and thinking dispositions
Variable NCS RQ ISK
NSA 0.02 0.11* 0.00
OL 0.08 0.06 0.21***
H 0.07 0.12** 0.15***
SC 0.00 0.06 −0.11*
SCDSD −0.29*** −0.18*** −0.18***
SCDR 0.10* 0.06 0.07
SCDVAR −0.11* −0.05 −0.07
NSA number of self-aspects, OL overlap, H Linville’s self-complexity
index, SC Sakaki’s self-complexity index, SCDSD average standard devi-
ation of trait ratings across roles, SCDR average correlation among the
roles, SCDVAR proportion of unshared variance among the roles, NCS
need for cognition, RQ reflection, ISK integrative self-knowledge
*** p≤0.001, ** p<0.01* p<0.05
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processes (Whitbourne et al. 2002). The latter were operation-
alized as individual differences in need for cognition
(Cacioppo et al. 1996), reflection (Trapnell and Campbell
1999), and integrative self-knowledge (Ghorbani et al.
2008); all of which can be considered indicative of adaptive
cognitive thinking.
As previously reported, several structural features of the
self-concept appeared to be a function of the quantity and
positivity of the self-descriptions. Not surprisingly, our results
concerning the relationships of self-complexity and self-
concept differentiation with adaptive outcomes were affected
by self-contents related variables. Participants’ mean ratings
of personality traits mediated the effects of self-concept dif-
ferentiation on global sense of identity, need for cognition, and
integrative self-knowledge. Also, the number of traits used in
the sort mediated the effects of overlap on integrative self-
knowledge. With this in mind, below we discuss the results
after controlling for these variables.
Among the set of self-structure variables, self-concept dif-
ferentiation showed negative association with global sense of
personal identity, suggesting that describing oneself different-
ly across social contexts was indicative of a weakened sense
of identity. These results are in line with other reports suggest-
ing that self-concept differentiation serves as a sign of psycho-
logical maladjustment (e.g., Campbell et al. 2003; Diehl and
Hay 2010; Diehl et al. 2001; Donahue et al. 1993; Lutz and
Ross 2003; McReynolds et al. 2000) and identity struggle
(e.g., Block 1961; Goldman 2004; Sheldon et al. 1997). Note,
however, that self-concept differentiation did not share unique
variance with global sense of identity when it was entered
simultaneously with other self-structure variables (see
Table 8, Study 1b). Overlap emerged as a negative predictor
for assimilation, thus indicating that greater unity in the self-
concept structure was associated with less reliance on identity
assimilation. It would seem that the identity processes of as-
similation in itself does not serve any purpose, unless there is a
dissonance within the self-concept, motivating an individual
to reduce existing discrepancies. This is consistent with
Whitbourne et al. (2002) descriptions of identity processes
as different approaches to processing identity-discrepant ex-
periences, different modes in dealing with changes in one’s
life.
It is worth noting, that the obtained results could also be
helpful for clarifying the relation between the two concepts –
self and identity. From the literature review (e.g., Baumeister
and Muraven 1996; Swann and Bosson 2010), one can note
that the distinction between self and identity is not consistently
well-established and the two concepts are sometimes used
interchangeably. Since, in the present studies, the associations
between self-structural indices and measures of personal iden-
tity had little predictive ability, it is tempting to assume that the
way we describe ourselves in different situations or contexts,
and the way we experience our selves are different phenome-
na. This conclusion is in line with authors who argue that the
distinction between self and identity should be made and
maintained (e.g., Berzonsky 2005; Katzko 2003; Oleś 2008).
It should also be noticed that corresponding results, essentially
no correlation between self-complexity and identity, were ob-
tained by Suchańska and Ligocka (2011), whose study used
different measures of identity, namely identity status and iden-
tity style approaches.
The results concerning the relationships of various mea-
sures of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation with
thinking dispositions indicated self-concept differentiation to
be the most important variable in predicting adaptive cogni-
tive endeavors. It showed unique associations with need for
cognition, reflection, and integrative self-knowledge. The di-
rection of these effects was by no means constant and sug-
gested that a strong, curiosity-driven, desire to engage in ef-
fortful thinking was associated with greater unity in the self-
concept. In line with the above results, integrative self-
knowledge appeared also to be positively related to overlap.
Once again, this result indicated that an adaptive capacity to
understand and integrate self-experience across time was as-
sociated with a more unified self-structure. Our results can
also be interpreted as providing evidence that active cognitive
Table 10 Summary of beta weights for regression analyses with thinking dispositions as the dependent variable
Source NCS RQ ISK
NSA −0.01 0.07 −0.08
OL 0.01 −0.01 0.16***
SCDSD −0.19*** −0.16*** −0.11*
NAT 0.05 0.11* 0.13**
PPAT 0.05 0.10* −0.01
MTR 0.22*** −0.02 0.15**
Model R2=0.14, F(6, 510) =13.57, p<0.001 R2=0.06, F(6, 510) =5.60, p<0.001 R2=0.11, F(6, 509) =10.81, p<0.001
NSA number of self-aspects,OL overlap, SCDSD average standard deviation of trait ratings across roles,NAT number of trait adjectives, PPAT proportion
of positive trait adjectives, MTR mean trait rating, NCS need for cognition, RQ reflection, ISK integrative self-knowledge
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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processing serves as a means of uniting self-experience and
reducing discrepancies within the self. As such, they support
theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature
(e.g., Berzonsky 2008; Campbell et al. 1996; Ghorbani et al.
2008; Njus and Johnson 2008; Trapnell and Campbell 1999).
Wewill sum upwith two concluding remarks: (1) measures
of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation do not nec-
essary measure what they have been purported to measure, (2)
results concerning the relationships of self-complexity and
self-concept differentiation with adaptive outcomes are gener-
ally affected by self-contents related variables; when the con-
founding factors were taken into account, the true effects of
structural features of the self-concept, while suggesting that
psychological well-being is associated with a stable and co-
herent self-concept, were of minor significance.
Though the present paper is unique in its consideration of
various measures of self-structure and exploring areas that had
not previously been investigated (e.g., examining the impact
of self-concept structure on cognitive processing), our find-
ings are not the first to indicate that the commonly used indi-
ces of self-complexity and self-concept differentiation may
lack validity (e.g., Baird et al. 2006; Locke 2003, 2006; Luo
et al. 2009; Rafaeli-Mor et al. 1999; Solomon and Haaga
2003). Indeed, the reasonable degree of consensus reflected
in the studies cited above argues for the invalidity, rather than
the validity, of the measures employed here. Yet, these mea-
sures have been and are still being used as indices of the
constructs they supposedly tap, thereby introducing potential
artifacts. As it stands, there seems to be a gap between the
available research evidence and using this evidence to change
the measurement practice. Until this gap is filled, it would be
premature to draw any definite conclusions about the relation-
ship between the structure of the self-concept and important
outcomes.
Limitations
The current investigation has a few limitations that merit dis-
cussion. First, the present studies included Polish participants
only. On the one hand, the relative homogeneity of the sam-
ples studied here was a strength, as there were likely to be
fewer confounding variables. On the other hand, it raises ques-
tions regarding the generalizability of the findings, for exam-
ple, whether the results would hold for individuals with dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds. A number of cultural psycholo-
gists have pointed out that people in collectivistic cultures (or
those with a predominantly interdependent self-construal) are
expected to show less cross-situational consistency in their
behavior (e.g., Choi and Choi 2002; Church et al. 2008; En-
glish and Chen 2007; Markus and Kitayama 1991).Moreover,
self-consistency is believed to be central to optimal function-
ing in individualistic cultures, but not in collectivistic cultures
(e.g., Cross et al. 2003; Pilarska 2014a; Suh 2002). It should
be noted that, with regard to cultural dimensions, Poland is
one of the countries which Hofstede (1984) identified as
an exception – while it is considered as an individualistic
society, it also has high scores on both power distance and
uncertainty avoidance (see also Minkov 2013; Murdoch
2009). As argued byReykowski (1994, 1998), despite popular
belief that there has been amajor change toward individualism
in Poland, strong collectivistic elements have persisted.
There was also another limitation in relation to the samples.
Given the developmental changes taking place during emerg-
ing adulthood (i.e., ages 18–25; Arnett 2000), the inclusion
criteria could have been stricter or age could have been intro-
duced as an additional independent variable. Since identity
exploration – an active experimentation with different social
roles – is thought to be an important feature of emerging
adulthood (e.g., Arnett 2000; Schwartz et al. 2005), there
may be a theoretical reason to expect age-related differences
in the structure of self-concept among our participants. Diehl
et al. (2001) obtained some evidence that self-concept differ-
entiation was related to age, and that the association between
self-concept differentiation and psychological well-being was
moderated by age. More precisely, the negative effect of self-
concept differentiation on psychological well-being was more
pronounced in older adults than in younger adults.
Finally, an additional limitation of our studies could be the
use of the Self-Incoherence Scale. This measure is similar to
the one used by Donahue et al. (1993), but with considerably
fewer adjectives, all of which are positively valenced. Since
the indices of self-concept differentiation are sensitive to the
within-role variation and the mean trait rating, perhaps using a
longer and more balanced list of traits could reduce (but by no
means eliminate) their limitations.
Recommendations
The conflation of self-concept structure and self-concept con-
tent evidenced by our results not only presents a problem for
research, but also challenges the underlying theoretical
models themselves. Both Linville’s (1987) and Donahue
et al.’s (1993) models assume that structure and content are
independent and, more specifically, that the valence of self-
content is unrelated to structure. While various authors have
reported on the inability to distinguish between structure and
content (valence) by the applied measures, the possibility that
the assumptions behind these models may themselves be the
problem has been given less attention. Yet, research by
Woolfolk and colleagues (1995, 2004) demonstrated that eval-
uative valence may affect self-complexity, and identified two
partially independent dimensions of self-complexity, namely
positive self-complexity and negative self-complexity. In a
similar vein, Locke (2006) provided support for the relative
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independence of positive and negative self-concept differenti-
ation. The possible effects of features of the self-knowledge,
other than valence, on the structure of the self-concept seem to
deserve further investigation. Meanwhile, whether it is just
that the currently available self-structural measures are vulner-
able to self-enhancement and social desirability biases (e.g.,
the over-endorsement of positive traits) or the contents of the
self-concept have an influence on the way they are organized,
the inclusion of a measure of self-esteem should be considered
standard practice in future studies utilizing measures of self-
structure.
Moreover, the search for potential moderators of the effects
of self-concept structure should continue. Only a few previous
studies (besides those mentioned earlier) have examined
whether the relationship between the structure of the self-
concept and psychological well-being was conditional on oth-
er variables. McConnell et al. (2005) found support for a
moderating role of self-aspects control, meaning that the pos-
itive relation between self-complexity and poor well-being
was evident among those with low perceived control over
their self-aspects. In another study, McConnell et al. (2006)
found interactions between self-complexity and three of the
Big Five major personality traits (openness, conscientious-
ness, and agreeableness) in accounting for differences in
well-being. The findings of Diehl and Hay (2011) revealed
that the relationship of self-concept differentiation and well-
being was qualified by self-concept clarity. Other relevant
factors that might moderate the effects of self-concept struc-
ture could include, for example, importance (centrality) of
one’s self-aspects and internalization of one’s self-aspects
(Ryan and Deci 2003).
Future research should also examine potential antecedents
of different dimensions of self-structure. There is very little
empirical evidence on what factors actually lead to individual
differences in the self-concept structure. To our knowledge,
except for cross-cultural studies, there have been only few
investigations on this topic. Using a developmental perspec-
tive, Evans and Seaman (2000) proposed that individual dif-
ferences in self-complexity could be explained by differences
in maturity of defense mechanisms. Also encouraging are the
findings by Lutz and Ross (2003) that link self-concept dif-
ferentiation to aspects of parental bonding. Moreover, conclu-
sions drawn from the longitudinal study of Donahue et al.
(1993) support the view that psychological adjustment may
be a causal antecedent to self-concept differentiation.
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